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ABSTRACT
This paper presents empirical evidence from U.S. data of a
structurally stable aggregate supply relationship between real and
nominal rates of interest and the rate of unemployment.The paper
reviews theories of contracts that are based on the twin assumptions
of asymmetric information and limited collateral and it argues that
these theories (referred to as A.I.L. theories) provide a strong
theoretical foundation for a contract—based theory of aggregate
supply.It is suggested that the original Phillips curve estimates
should be reinterpreted in the light of A.I.L. theories which
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TA3LE I
Reduced Formand2SLS Estimates
The Reduced Form Estimates for DUNEM
Variable Coefficient Standard Error t-Value
DPRATE 1 30.86013 13.55965 2.2759
DLRPRF 1 -8.62344 3.33673 -2.5844
DDLPRIC1 -6.02328 5.11099 2.2154
DLPRICEI 11.32267 5.11099 2.2154
DLRCONS1 3.03328 7.86273 .3858
DLHMON 1 -9.44258 2.94940 -3.2015
DDLRGNP1 -5.58095 4.58824 -1.2164
DDLHMON2 .62968 4.84670 .1299
DdLRGNP2 6.67657 4.32808 1.0805
Reduced Form —1.3797980 Residual Sum of Squares —85.6729126
R2 —.50888 F(9,45) —5.18089 Durbin Watson Statistic —2.52
The Reduced Form Estimates for DDLPRIC
Variable Coefficient Standard Error t-Value
DPRATE 1 .39698 .24265 1.6360
DLRPRF 1 -.22701 .05971 -3.8019
DDLPRICI .28557 .09678 2.9507
DLPRICE1 -.57685 .09146 -6.3070
DLRCONS1 .64766 .14070 4.6030
DLI-LMON 1 .17976 .05278 3.4059
DDLRGNP1 .16045 .08211 1.9542
DDUNON2 .01495 .08673 .1724
DDLRGNP2 -.06147 .07745 -.7936
Reduced Form —.0246917 Residual Sum of Squares —.0274355
R2 —.67899 F(9,45) —10.57576 Durbin Watson Statistic —2.01
Two-State Least Squares Estimates for DUNEM
1Endogenous and 2 Exogenous Variables with 9 Instruments
Variable Coefficient Standard Error t-Value
DDLPRIC -19.50165 5.54802 -3.5151
DPRATE1 42.73199 11.41742 3.7427
DLRPR.F1 -10.68548 1.64866 -6.4813
Instruments Used:
DDLPRIC1DLPRICEIDLRCONS1DLHMON1 DDLRCNPI DDLHMON2DDLRGNP2
Residual Sum of Squares —77.831906990 —1.2353606Durbin-Watson —2.033
Reduced Form —1.37979799Specification Chi2 (6)/6 —1.89
Chi2(3)/3Testing ! —0:16.95TABLE II
Comparisonsof 2SLS Estimates For Different Sample Periods
1 Endogenous and 2 Exogenous Variables With 6 Instruments
Peri o d 933-1945
Varjih1e adardError t-Value
DDLPRIC -32.00162 8.68435 3.6850
DPRATE1 68.55340 116.41942 .4171
DLRPP.F1 -14.88498 2.56745 -5.7976
IrLstrumentsUsed: DDDLRGN2 DDLRCON1 DDLk'M0N2DDLPRIC1
Residual Sum of Squares —16.157650115 —1.3398860Durbin-Watson —1.76
Reduced Form —2.85964940Specification Chi2(3)/3 —.89
Chi2(3)/3Testing £ —0:L2.47
erjod:1946-l9.
VariabJ Coefficient Standjd. Error t-Val'.ie
DDLPRIC -7.14713 9.70822 -.7362
DPRATE1 39.03005 9.22832 4.2294
DLRPRF1 -6.29407 2.32061 -2.7122
Instruments Used: DDDLRGN2DDLRCONIDDUINON2DDLPRICI
Residual Sum of Squares —35.137310873 —.9615956Durbin-Watson —2.371
Reduced Form—.95093673Specification Chi2(3)/3 —1.70
Chi2(3)/3 Testing .t —0:7.95
Full: Sam1e Period
Variable Coefficient Standard Error t-Value
DDLPRIC -21.59181 7.33891 -2.9421
DPRATE1 42.19304 11.67587 3.6137
DLRPRFI .11.30842 1.85985 -6.0803
InstrumentsUsed: DDDLRCON1DDLHMON2DDLPRICI
Residual Sum of Squares —76.435856954 —1.2364130Durbin-Watson —2.054
Reduced Form —1.48459869Specification Chi2(3)/3 —.24
Testing £ —0:15.98B) Test of DLRCMP1vs. DLRPRFI
Model 1 regresses DUNEM on DDLPRIC, DPRATE1, and DLRPRF1
Model 2 regresses DUNEM on DDLPRIC, DPRATE1, and DLRPRF1
Both regressions use the instruments: DPRATE1, DLRPRF1, DDLPRICI, DLPRICE1,
DLRCONS1, DLHMON1, DDLRGNPI, DDLHMON2, DDLRGNP2, DLRCMP1.

















A) Test ofDUNEJI 1 vs. DLRPRF1
Model 1 regresses DUNEMonDDLPRIC, DPRATE1, and DLRPRFI
Model 2 regresses DUNEMonDDLPRIC, DPRATE1, and DUNEM1
Both regressions use the instruments: DPRATE1, DLRPRFI, DDLPRICI, DLPRICEI,
DLRCONS1, DLHMON1 •DDLRGNP1,DDLHMON2, DDLRGNP2 •DUNEM1.
Test Results
Model 1 vs. Model 2Form Test Form Model 2 vs. Model 1
- .303 N(0,l) Ericsson IV N(0,l) 7.629
10.717 Chi2(7) Sargan Chi2(7) 22.669
.096 F(1,50)Joint Model F(l,50) 27.425






NB: (A) tests whetherlagged unemployment is a better explanatory variable
thanlagged profits.(B) tests if lagged real compensation to
employees is better. Both tests overwhelmingly pick lagged profits
overthe alternative.1
Introduction
My focus in this paper is the role of certain recent microeconomic
contract-based theories in helping us to understand the theory of aggregate
supply. Typically, these theories are viewed as part of a search for the
underpinnings of Keynesian explanations of the Phillips curve. Contract
theories are supposed to explain why prices are sticky and thereby help us
understand why unemployment may temporarily deviate from its 'natural rate'
I shall argue that this view of the role of contract theories is fallacious.
Contract theories do not justify the status quo;instead they provide a
powerful alternative to both Neo-Keynesian and New-Classical theories of
aggregate supply.
The group of theories that I am referring to is a subset of the class
of all contract theories that takes, as its starting point, two important
premises. The first of these premises is that contracts are written between
parties who are asymmetrically informed about the state of the world. The
second premise is that agents have limited access to collateral. To differ-
entiate the members of this class of theories from more familiar insurance-
based approaches to contract theory I shall refer to them as Asymmetric
Information limited Liquidity theories or AlL theories in short.1
The most prominent feature that separates AlL theories from both Neo-
Keynesian and New-Classical theories of aggregate supply is that AlL
theories deny the utility of the concept of the natural rate of unemploy-
ment. According to standard popular approaches to macroeconomics, cyclical
variability of the level of economic activity is due either to intertemporal
substitution of leisure or to sticky prices of one kind or another. In
either case, short run fluctuations in employment occur mainly as a result
of the failure of agents to perfectly forecast future economic conditions.
The long run upward movements in unemployment rates that have occurred in2
both the U.S. and Europe in recent years are perceived to be due to
structural adjustment problems or as due to hysteresis effects that have
altered the natural rate. The AlL contract-based alternative, on the other
hand, explains both cyclical and long-run movements in the unemployment rate
as rationally anticipated fluctuations in an equilibriujii rate of unernploy-
ment that are caused by movements in real and nominal interest rates. The
advantage of this approach is that it unifies a theory of short run
fluctuations in employment with a theory of long term movements in the level
of economic activity.
I have argued elsewhere2 that a contract theory based on asymmetric
information and limited collateral has strong theoretical claims to be given
serious consideration a a replacement to the Phelps-Friedman theory of the
expectations-augmented Phillips curve.I briefly review this argument in
section (3) of this paper. The main contribution of this work is, howeVer,
empirical. In section (6) I present estimates of an AlL based theory of
supply from U.S. annual time series data. The relationship not only fits
well- it also remains structurally stable over the entire post-war sample
period. A researcher who had estimated an AlL based equation using only
pre-war data would not go far wrong if he or she applied the same parametric
model to post-war data from 1946 up to the present day.
1. Related Literature
A number of authors have been concerned with the effects of collateral
on macroeconomic theory, and with the role of informational asymmetries in
te theory of financial intermediation. I view the present work as comple-
mentary to this literature. One of the earliest theoretical pieces on the
theory of financial intermediation is the work by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981)
on credit rationing. Mark Certler and Ben Bernanke (1987) have made a
number of important contributions and papers by Bruce Smith (1983), Steve3
Wiliamson (1986), Creenwald and Stiglitz (1986), and Fazzari, Hubbard and
Peterson (1987) have explored both theoretical and empirical implications of
theories of imperfect financial intermediation. This literature is
comprehensively surveyed in the paper by Mark Gertler (1988).
My difference is one of emphasis. Most of the work that I cite above
is concerned with the implications of informational assymetries for the
theory of aggregate demand and it is my impression that these authors have
in mind a fairly standard transmission mechanism, from demand fluctuations
to output, that operates through price inflexibility on the supply side. It
is my contention, in this paper, that the same set of theories that offers a
potential explanation of, for example, the Keynesian investment multiplier
also suggests a very different mechanism for the transmission of policy
shocks to aggregate supply. It is the theory of supply that I concentrate
on below.
2. The Stylized Facts
In this section of the paper I summarize three stylized facts that
concern the relationship between inflation, the rate of interest and
employment.I than offer an interpretation of these facts in terms of an
AlL based theory of aggregate supply.
FACTNUMBER1.
In the United Kingdom there was a marked and fairly stable inverse
relationship between unemployment and the rate of wage inflation from 1861
well into the 1960's. Beyond this date the relationship appears to have
broken down and parts of the 1970's and 1980's have been characterized by
the simultaneous occurrence of both high inflation and high unemployment.4
PIANATION
Thetraditional explanation for the Phillips curve relationship is as awage
adjustment equation. According to this interpretation, high unemployment
causes wages to fall as part of a disequilibrium adjustment process.
The AlL based theory reverses the direction of causation. Under the
AlL interpretation, a high rate of inflation is associated with a low
realized rate of interest. When the real rate of interest is low, the
equilibrium frequency of contract failures is low. These contract failures
may manifest themselves as bankruptcies or as layoffs. In either case,
contract terminations are rationally anticipated outcomes of negotiations
between asymmetrically informed parties; that is, the form of the contract
as explained not assumed as in more traditional ad-hoc contract based
theories that have been advanced as possible justifications for sticky-price
Keynesian theories of supply.3
The Phelps-Friedman explanation of the disappearing Phillips curve
relies on the idea that original estimates of the relationship neglected to
take account of the influence of expectations on the wage formation process.
The AlL interpretation of the facts also relies on an omitted variable
problem but in AlL theory it is the influence of the rate of interest that
has been omitted and not the effect of (un-observable) inflationary
expectations. Until the mid 1960's the nominal rate of interest exhibited
very little movement relative to its more recent fluctuations (see figure
(III) which documents this assertion for U.S. data). Failure to take
account of the interest rate as an explanatory variable in the aggregate
supply equation caused the estimated Phillips curvetoshift in the 1970's
when a high and volatile rate of interest became part of the background of
central bank monetary policy.5
FACTNUMBER 2
Inpost-war U.S. time series data there is a strong correlation between
lagged values of the rate of interest and values of the unemployment rate.
The mean lag is about nine months. If the influence of expected inflation is
removed from the series, the role of the nominal interest rate is still
significant; that is, the nominal interest rate exerts an influence on the
level of aggregate economic activity that is independent of the expected
real rate of return.4
EXPLA1ATION
The role of the nominal interest rate fits naturally into AlL based
theories in which a lack of liquidity is an important factor that
contributes to a high incidence of layoffs. The nominal rate of interest
represents the opportunity cost of holding money and an optimal contract
balances this opportunity Cost against the benefit of additional liquidity.
In AlL theories this benefit arises from the fact that a high cushion of
liquidity allows firms to offer a more stable wage. Ex-post stability of
the contracted wage, in the presence of fluctuations in the marginal
productivity of labor, allows the firm to make more efficient employment
decisions. If a firm had to raise the wage every time that it wished to
expand output, then it would be less likely to expand in times of high
productivity.
The simplest way to think of the chain by which the nominal rate of
interest affects employment is to view money as a productive asset; money
enters the production function and directly affects aggregate supply. If
the opportunity cost of holding money rises than firms will use less of it.
Since money is a Complement to labor, the net effect is that high interest
rates are associated with less employment in equilibrium.6
FACTNUMBER 3
The unemployment rate in the United States exhibits a significant
degree of persistence. An A.R.I.M.A. (1,1,0) process fits reasonably well
to twentieth century annual data with an auto-regressive co-efficient of
approximately 0.5.
EXPLANATION
It has recently become common practice to explain the persistence of
unemployment in terms of hysteresis effects.5 Under this interpretation,
unemployment has remained high in recent years because workers remain outof
thelabor force in the face of persistent spells of demand induced
unemployment. This effect causes an increase in the natural rate. Under
AlL theories, on the other hand, unemployment is highly auto-correlated
because the lagged value of the unemployment rate serves as a proxy for the
effects of financial structure on the efficiency of labor contracts. I
provide evidence in section (6) of this paper that the value of previous
periods profits is a more appropriate regressor, in an aggregate supply
equation, than is the lagged value of the unemployment rate. The real value
of last periods profits is an important explanatory variable because when
profits are high entrepreneurs do not need to borrow as much from external
sources in order to finance their activities. High profits reduce the
dependence of the entrepreneur on outside funding and, by so doing, reduce
the production inefficiencies that are induced by contracts between
asymmetrically informed parties.
3. A Review of AlL Theory.
In this section I review the structure of AlL based theories. The
presentation is broken into three parts each of which is designed to explain
the role of three explanatory variables in the AlL theory of aggregate
supply. These variables are the real rate of interest, the nominal rate of7
interest and the profits that are earned by entrepreneurs.
Throughout this section, I maintain the simplifying assumption that
future prices are perfectly foreseen. Although uncertainty is important in
AlL theory it is uncertainty about the productivity of individual enter-
prises that provides the motive for agents to write contracts. The basic
theory does not differentiate between the anticipated real rate of interest
and the realized real rate of interest and it is eclectic on which of these
variables should enter the aggregate supply function. This important issue
is treated in section (4) in which I discuss the question of the indexation
of nominal contracts to observed prices.
I. THE ROLE OF THE REAL RATE OFINTEST
Themost direct way of explaining why the real rate of interest is a
key variable in AlL theories of supply is by means of a parable. Think of a
simple economy in which all output is produced by one-person-firms. These
firms are owned and operated by self-employed risk-neutral entrepreneurs
each of whom may combine a single unit of his own labor with a single unit
of capital. Nothing of substance hinges on the assumption that the techno-
logy is of this rather simple form although it is important that there
should be at least two inputs. The second input introduces a role for a
second individual and provides a motive for a contract. I refer to the
second individual as a banker and to stress the fact that risk-sharing does
not play a role in AlL theories I assume that this second individual is also
risk-neutral. The role of the banker is to provide sufficient funds to the
entrepreneur to enable him to purchase a machine.
The process of production yields an uncertain future return and the
distribution of this return is known by both the entrepreneur and the
banker. These two individuals must write a Contract that specifies how the
proceeds of the enterprise will be divided up between them. At this point8
AlL theories introduce a key assumption:
ASYMMETRIC theentrepreneur has better information
INFORMATION about the productivity of his own business than does the
banker.
This assumption is an important ingredient of theories that rely on
informational asymmetries and it is a feature that is missing in more
familiar insurance based approaches to contract theory. The role of the
assumption is to limit the set of contracts that can be written to those
that are indexed to common verifiable information. Its effect is to Link
together the employment rule and the loan repayment schedule in any contract
that is acceptable to both parties. This linkage is achieved by the
principle that a contract will be acceptable to the banker if it provides
the entrepreneur with ai incentive to truthfully reveal the productivity of
the enterprise.6 Any contract that has this property must take account of
the fact that, ex-post, the entrepreneur will make the employment decision
that is in his own best interests. Since the entrepreneur will make this
decision by comparing the marginal product of employment with the marginal
amount that he must pay to the banker, it follows that the loan repayment
schedule and the employment level cannot be separated from each other.
At this point AlL theories introduce a second key assumption:
LIMITED the collateral of the entrepreneur is limited by his own
COLLATERAL wealth.
This assumption limits the amount that the entrepreneur can pay to the
banker in the worst possible state of nature.
In order to clearly explain the combined implications of these two
assumptions I make the simplifying assumption that the technology permits
only two possible employment decisions. The entrepreneur may decide either9
to work or to lay himself off. Further assume that the banker observes
whether or not the entrepreneur decides to work but that he cannot observe
either the productivity of the enterprise or ex.post profits. These
assumptions imply that the set of acceptable contracts consists of those
that make one payment to the banker if production takes place and a
different payment if it does not.
It is at this point that the real rate of interest enters the picture.
The expected real rate of interest represents the value of the banker's
opportunity cost of funds. The higher is this ex-ante expected return, the
higher must be the expected value of the banker's share of the enterprise.
Since the payment received by the banker in the event of bankruptcy is
limited by the wealth of the entrepreneur, an increase in the rate of
interest must be accompanied by an increase in the payment that is promised
to the banker in the event that production takes place. ut herein lies the
essence of the AlL approach to aggregate supply. The entrepreneur's ex-post
employment decision is itself a function of the amount that must be paid to
the banker. Once a contract has been written and the state of nature is
revealed to the entrepreneur he will decide whether or not to declare
bankruptcy by comparing his ex-post utility under two alternative employment
decisions. In order to induce the entrepreneur to work, the marginal
product of employment must exceed his disutility of effort: in addition it
must be sufficiently high to cover the marginal increment in the loan-
repayment-schedule. If the ex-ante real interest rate increases then the
increment in the loan-repayment-schedule must also increase and, ex-post,
there will be fewer states of nature in which the entrepreneur finds it
worthwhile to employ himself.
In an economy that consists of a large number of self-employed
entrepreneurs, each of whom receives an idiosyncratic productivity shock,10
the aggregate quantity of output that is produced will be a decreasing
function of the real rate of interest because a higher real interest rate
induces a higher equilibrium frequency of contract failures. This is the
basic mechanism that underlies AlL theories of aggregate supply.
II. THE ROLE OF THE NOIIINAL RATE OF INTEREST.
A slight modification to the above story will serve to illustrate the
role that money may play in the productive process. Consider a scenario in
which an entrepreneur must write a contract with a single worker. In order
not to complicate this picture unnecessarily let us assume that the entre-
preneur has no need of a banker since he has sufficient collateral to
purchase his own capital equipment. As in the previous discussion, assume
that there are only two possible employment states -theworker may work or
he may be laid off. Unlike the previous story however it is now the worker,
and not the entrepreneur, who supplies his labor time to the enterprise.
The worker observes his ownex-postlabor supply whereas the entrepreneur
observes the random productivity of the enterprise.
The way that one may introduce money into this story is by requiring
that the worker should be paid in cash. The entrepreneur may invest his
wealth in the formofproductive capital in the enterprise, but in so doing
this capital is tied up and becomes unavailable for use in making wage
payments to the worker. He must decide, ex-ante, how much of his wealth to
retain in the formofliquid assets and how much of it to sink into more
productive, but less available, capital.7
The worker and the entrepreneur must negotiate a contract that offers
the worker a sufficiently high ex-ante expected return to induce him to
forego his next best alternative. But, as in the situation that we
discussed above, the set of acceptable contracts is limited to those that11
make one payment to the worker if he is employed and another payment if he
is laid off. The payment that the worker receives if he is laid off is
limited by the liquid assets of the entrepreneur. It follows that the lower
the liquidity position that is taken by the entrepreneur the larger must be
the wage that is paid to the worker if he is employed; that is, a low level
of liquidity will be associated with a high degree of variability in the
contracted-wage-schedule. But the degree of variability of the contracted-
wage-schedule will itself affect the probability that the entrepreneur will
decide to employ the worker. In making an ex-post employment decision the
entrepreneur will compare the worker's marginal product to the marginal
increment in his wage-schedule. The larger is the gap between the layoff
payment and the employment payment the lower is the probability that the
worker will be employed.
It is at this point that the role of the nominal interest rate enters
the picture. The money rate of interest represents the opportunity cost of
holding cash and the entrepreneur must balance this opportunity cost against
the benefit that is afforded by a less volatile employment-schedule. If the
interest rate rises then the entrepreneur will hold less cash. To
compensate the worker for the fact that he will be paid less if he is laid
off, the contracted- wage-schedule must promise to pay more to the worker if
he is employed. But this additional variability in the wage-schedule will
cause the entrepreneur to be less likely, ex-post, to decide to employ the
worker. Across the whole economy a higher rate of interest will be
associated with a lower level of liquidity and with a higher frequency of
layoffs. It is this basic mechanism that causes the nominal rate of
interest to be an important explanatory variable in AlL theories of
aggregate supply.12
III. THE ROLE OF PROFITS.
In AlL theory contracts will be more efficient if entrepreneurs are
able to finance a higher proportion of their activities with internally
generated sources of funds. Take a simple example in which all output is
produced by entrepreneurs who face a set of identical projects of the type
that I discussed in part (I). If all projects are of given size then the
most efficient way of organizing production is for each entrepreneur to own
a single plant that is purchased with his own funds. A social organization
of this type will maximize the social product since it eliminates the effi-
ciency distortions that are introduced by contracts between asymmetrically
informed agents. Whether or not such an organization will arise in a
competitive economy depends on the relationship between the technology,
which dictates efficient plant size, and the wealth distribution, which
determines the extent to which production requires individuals to share the
entrepreneurial role. Those individuals who are wealthier are more likely
to become entrepreneurs because they will need to borrow less from other
individuals in order to set up a firm. Wealth bestows a comparative
advantage in the role of entrepreneurship because it permits the individual
to make more efficient production decisions. As an economy evolves over
time, the distribution of income between entrepreneurs and other members of
society will itself affect the efficiency with which productive activity is
organized. If entrepreneurs receive a large share of national income then
these individuals will need to borrow less in future periods from other
members of society. A high current level of profit will be associated with
a high future level of economic activity because it reduces the dependence
of entrepreneurs on less efficient sources of outside funding. It is this
basic mechanism that explains why profits are included as an explanatory
variable in AlL theories of aggregate supply.13
4. The Indexation of Contracts
One of the issues that has caused problems for Neo-Keynesian contract
theories concerns the indexation of contracts. According to these theories,
firms offer contracts to workers in which wages are stable because workers
are risk averse and, ceteris-paribus, they would prefer a stable income
stream to one that fluctuates. But this explanation is widely recognized to
be flawed. The Neo-Keynesian theory of aggregate supply relies on an assum-
ption that agents write contracts in which money wages are predetermined.
Stable money wages do not insure workers against fluctuations in the value
of the monetary unit; indeed quite the opposite is the case. Predetermined
money wages expose workers to the risk of income fluctuations in the face of
demand disturbances that presumably these individuals would prefer to avoid.
AlL theories do not face this problem. In the basic theory that I
outlined in section (3) I made the strong assumption that there was no
aggregate uncertainty. This assumption is clearly counter-factual and it
must be modified if the theory is to be applied to the data. The most
straightforward way in which to introduce aggregate uncertainty is to assume
that the price level fluctuates randomly and that this fluctuation is
independent of the idiosyncratic production uncertainty that is faced by any
particular entrepreneur. This would be the case, for example, if all
aggregate fluctuations arose as a result of random policy actions on the
part of the central bank. In this situation it is meaningful to distinguish
between the ex-ante expected real rate of interest and the ex-post realized
real rate. Which of these two variables is the appropriate regressor in an
AlL theory of aggregate supply? The answer to this question is that, if
both parties are risk-neutral, then they will be indifferent to a contract
in which the money wage rate is indexed to the observable price level and
one in which it is not. If one party is more risk averse than the other14
then the details of the employment contract and, in particular, the degree
to which the contract is indexed to the price level, will depend on the
relative curvature of the utility functions of the entrepreneur and of the
worker. In AlL theory unanticipated shocks do not play a central role in
explaining employment fluctuations and consequently the issue of contract
indexation is secondary.
Although from a theoretical point of view one might happy with this
approach -- itdoes lead to a number of difficulties in empirically testing
the theory.It is clearly not a good description of the real world to
assume that future prices are perfectly foreseen and it is almost certainly
true that one of the roles of liquid assets (a role that is not captured by
the theory that I have discussed) is to provide a guarantee of payment
against aggregate fluc'ations in income. By neglecting to model the role
of aggregate uncertainty it is likely -- tothe extent that aggregate
uncertainty is important in the real economy -- thatthe theories that I
have described above will generate predictions that are at odds with the
facts. One place in which this problem is likely to manifest itself is in
the counterfactual implication, of the simple AlL theory, that the business
cycle is symmetric. Upswings are predicted to last for just as long, and to
be just as severe, as downswings8 although we know that this is not the case
at least in the U.S.
In applying the theory to U.S. data I have taken account of the fact
that most contracts seem to contain only limited indexing provisions and I
shall therefore interpret the real interest rate variable as an ex-post
rate. This approach side-steps the issue of aggregate fluctuations and it
does not offer a satisfactory solution. However, in the absence of a well
formulated theory of contracts in general equilibrium, that takes account of
the effects of aggregate disturbances, it is as close as I am able to come15
to providing a consistent theoretical implementation of the ideas that I
have described above. The details of the empirical implementation of my
approach are described in the next section.
5. Frog Theory to Evidence
In the next two sections of the paper I explore the statistical
evidence for an AlL based theory of supply. My data consists of annual
time series on four basic explanatory variables for the period from 1929 to
1986. These variables are:
PR.ATE I .. ..theperiod t-l interest rate on six month commercial
loans,
DLPRICE .. . .thelogarithmic difference of the period t and period t-l
values of the GNP deflator,
UNEM the period t unemployment rate,
LRPROF1 .. .thelogarithm of the period t-l value of real national
income, net of real compensation to employees.
These variables are graphed in figures (I) and (II) from which it is
apparent that each of these variables has experienced a marked upward trend
over the sample period. The Durbin-Watson statistics for the residuals of a
regression of each of these series on a constant are presented below:
PRATE—.13 DLPRICE—.78
UNEM —.18 LRPROF —.04
J.D. Sargan and Alok Ehargava present a test for stationarity of a time
series that is based on the Durbin Watson statistic. The critical value of
this test for a simple random walk with a sample size of 57 is approximat-
ely .49 and hence three of these series (the inflation series is the
exception) do not seem to be stationary. Since standard asymptotic theory
does not apply to non-stationary data the regression results that I report
below are based on first differences.9 The data in first difference form is16
presented in figures (III) and (IV) and the corresponding Durbin Watson
statistics are given by:
DPRATE 1 —1.57 DDLPRICE —2.02
DUNEM —. 93 DLRPROF—1.02.
The profits variable that I have chosen to work with consists,
essentially, of the sumofproprietors incomes, rental income, corporate
profits and net interest as reported in the national income and product
accounts of the United States. This is a very broad interpretation of
entrepreneurial income but has the advantage of avoiding the problem that
the category in which profits are reported depends in an arbitrary way on
the tax laws.
In addition to the four basic variables I have also used annual data on
the real values of consump..ion, GNP and the stock of high powered money as
instruments in instrumental variables estimation of aggregate supply. The
consumption and CNP data is taken from the national income and products
accounts: the series on high powered money for earlier years is assembled
from various Federal Reserve publications and for the post-war period it is
taken from the Economic Report of the President.
6. The Evidence For A Stable Suplv Relationship
The regression equation that I have estimated for these data series
takes the form:
[1] DUNEM—-l9.5*DDLPRICE+42.7*DPRATE1 -10.7*DLRPROF1,
(5.5 ) (11.4) (1.6 )
wherestandard errors appear in parentheses. The equation was estimated for
the entire sample period and for various sub-periods to check stability
across pre-war and post-war samples. Equation [I] reports the results that
I obtained for the full sample using a recursive instrumental variables17
estimator.1OI used instrumental variables because the current value of the
price level appears as a regressor on the right hand side of the equation
and one would expect that this variable would also enter an aggregate demand
equation in a complete system.I used a recursive estimator as a means of
checking the stability of the parameter estimates over the sample period.
The instruments were chosen by picking lagged values of variables that
one would expect to appear in the reduced form of a small econometric model.
The complete set of instruments that was used to estimate equation [1) is
the lagged difference in the inflation rate
the lagged value of the logarithmic inflation rate
the lagged value of the logarithmic money growth rate






DLRCONS1....thelagged value in the logarithm of real consumption
expenditure.
The reduced form equations for DUNEM and for DDLPRICE are presented in Table
I, which also reports some additional statistics for the instrumental
variable regression. The choice of instruments does not make a great deal
of difference to the IV. estimates and I experimented with a number of
alternatives including lagged values of investment, of government expendi-
ture and various lags of the first and second differences of the logarithm








the real logarithmic growth rate of
the logarithmic money growth rate,18
Equation (1) is typical of the results that I obtained using a number
of different sample periods and a number of different instrument sets.1 I
have not restricted the coefficient on DDLPRICE to be equal and of opposite
sign to the coefficient on DPRATE I and it is clear from the precision with
which these coefficients are estimated that a restriction of this nature
would be rejected by the data with high probability. That is, one cannot
accept the proposition that it is only the real rate of interest that
belongs in the aggregate supply equation rather than real and nominal rates
of interest separately. This statement does, however, deserve some quali-
fication since the effects of the nominal interest rate and of the inflation
rate are being picked out by the data over very different sample periods.12
Figure (III) graphs the difference in the inflation rate and the
difference in the nominal interest rate over the period from 1931 to 1986.
Notice that for the initial part of the sample period there is a great deal
of variability in the inflation rate but not much movement at all in the
rate of interest. In the latter part of the sample period this situation is
reversed. One might suspect that the data will be unable to identify the
coefficient on the interest rate in pre-war data and that it will similarly
be unable to identify the separate effect of the inflation rate in post-war
data. This suspicion is born out in Table (II) in which I present separate
estimates for pre 1945 and post-war samples. Since there are only 12 obser-
vations in the pre 1945 sample I was forced to use a restricted instrument
set that drops DDLRGNP 1, DLHNON 1 and DLPRICE I as a way of increasing the
number of degrees of freedom. Table (II) also reports estimates for the
pooled sample using the restricted instrument set.
The remarkable feature of all of the estimates that I obtained is that
they remain stable over the entire post-war sample period. Figures (V),
(VI) and (VII) present recursive estimates of the coefficients on the19
realized inflation rate, on the lagged interest rate and on profits, for
sequential sample periods beginning with the period 1933 to 1964 and ending
with the sample period 1933 to 1986. The dashed lines are approximate 5%
standard error bounds. As an indication of the stability of this relation-
ship in post-war data, Figure (VIII) presents a graph of fitted versus
actual values of DUNEM for the period from 1933 to 1986. This equation is
estimated using data from 1933 to 1958 but it is graphed for the entire
sample period. Although there is some evidence of a break between pre-war
and post-war samples, a researcher who had estimated equation [1] usingdata
from 1929 up until 1945 would not have gone far wrong in applying these
estimates to the post-war period.13
In Section (3) of the paper I discussed the issue of the persistence of
unemployment. As a test of whether lagged profits is an appropriate explan-
atory variable in an aggregate supply equation I ran a number of
encompassing tests in which various additional explanatory variables were
tested as alternatives to lagged profits. In all of the equations that I
tested the functional form that includes only DLRPROF 1, DDLPRICE and
DPRATE I performed significantly better than the joint model and the
alternative model that did not include lagged profits was rejected. Table
(III) reports the outcome of two of these tests. The top panel of the table
tests an alternative model in which lagged profits is replaced by the lagged
unemployment rate. Notice that this alternative model is overwhelmingly
rejected against the joint model which includes both DLRPROF 1 and DUNEM I
as regressors --theF-statistic of 27.425 is well outside the 5% error
bound, under the null, of 4.034. The model that drops lagged unemployment
and includes only lagged profits, however, cannot be rejected with an F-
statistic of .096. The second panel of Table (III) presents similar results
for a test of the model that replaces lagged profits with the lagged value20
of compensation to employees. This model is again overwhelmingly rejected
in favor of the AlL specification.
7. Conclusion
I hope to have persuaded the reader that the statistical evidence that
I have presented lends qualified support to AlL theories of aggregate supply
and that these theories offer a more promising research agenda for macro-
economics than the Phelps-Friedman alternative. In concluding I should add
that if this view is correct it follows that expectational surprises play,
at best, a secondary role in the business cycle. One is left with a view of
the transmission mechanism, from policy to output, that occurs through the
effects of intertemporal relative prices. According to this view, fiscal
and monetary policy can affect the level of economic activity in the lot
run if and only if they can influence real and nominal rates of interest.
There is little doubt that the money rate of interest is free to be chosen
in a fiat money economy and, in this sense, the non superneutrality of money
that I have described above is likely to prove uncontroversial. One may
reasonably argue that these kinds of non-superneutralities are likely to be
unimportant in practice but this is a matter that is at least potentially
capable of being decided by the evidence.
The ability of policy to influence the real rate of interest is a
different matter. There are skeptics who will point to both theoretical
and empirical reasons for doubting that this theory will provide a
successful explanation of the transmission mechanism. On the empirical
side, the real rate of interest in the post war U.S. seems to be quite well
described by a first order autoregressive process and it does not seem to be
Cranger caused by any other economic time series.14 On the theoretical
side, if one works within the representative agent paradigm, then one would
not expect that fiscal policy could influence the real rate of return in the21
long run. But this is not the only possible interpretation of the facts and
the representative agent paradigm is not the only framework that one might
use to organize the data. The overlapping generations model is an equally
useful framework and, within this structure, one would predict that fiscal
policy can have permanent long run effects on the rate at which agents can
make intertemporal trades. From the overlapping generations perspective,
the finding that fiscal policy does not Cranger cause the real rate of
interest represents evidence of a highly elastic aggregate supply curve.15
In any event, these issues will not be decided by the evidence that I
have presented in this paper: they require a more fully specified
theoretical model and a more complete simultaneous equations approach to the
data: there is still much work to be done. In 1958, A.'J. Phillips closed his
pper with the lines:
"These conclusions are of course tentative. There is need for
much more detailed research into the relations between
unemployment, wage rates, prices and productivity."
Thirty years of intensive theoretical and applied work does not seem to have
brought us much closer to a resolution.22
Endnotes
*This work was supported by NSF Grant #SAS-8722432. I wish to thank
Glenn Hubbard for his comments.
1Some of the more recent approaches to contract theory combine
asymmetric information with an insurance based approach. The O.J.E. supple-
ment, vol. 98 1983, edited by Azariadis and Stiglitz contains a number of
such papers. This volume goes only part way to providing the kind of
alternative theory of supply that I am referring to and, for the most part,
it is oriented to the task of explaining the Neo-Keynesian assumption of
sticky prices. AlL theories require the additional assumption of limited
collateral.
2Roger E.A. Farmer, "A New Theory of Aggregate Supply" (1984>. Also
see "Money and Contracts", (1988a) which discusses the effect of nominal
interest rates on aggregate supply in a general equilibrium model.
should be pointed out that the implications of AlL based theories
of aggregate supply are distinct from New-Classical Inter-Temporal-Substi-
tution (I.T.S.) theoriesis which also stress the role of real interest
rates. In I.T.S. theories agents supply more labor today if the currently
anticipated real rate of interest is high. In contrast, AlL theories
predict that employment will be high today if the rate of return that is
realized today is low. Both the timing and the sign of the relationship
differ between the two theories. AlL theories are also eclectic on the
distinction between the effects of the anticipated real rate of interest and
the realized rate. Which of these variables is important depends on whether
contracts are indexed to the observable rate of inflation. This in turn de-
pends on agents attitudes to risk sharing which in AlL theories are seen as
second order effects. Section (4) discusses the indexation issue in more23
depth.
4C.A. Sims, "Comparison of Interwar and Postwar Cycles: Monetarism
Reconsidered" American Economic Review vol. 70, 1980. Sims documents this
assertion for small vector auto-regressions. Evidence for the effect of
nominal interest rates after correcting for anticipated inflation is found
in Litterman and Weiss, "Money Real Interest Rates, and Output: A Reinter-
pretation of Postwar U.S. Data", Econometrica vol. 53, number 1 January
1985.
5See, for example, the paper by Blanchard and Summers, "Hysteresis and
the European Unemployment Problem," in the 1986 NBER Macroeconomics Annual.
A number of authors have recently begun to question the natural rate
hypothesis in the light of recent European experience. Several papers on
he issue are collected in the American Economic Review May 1988 papers and
proceedings. Most writers on the topic, however, maintain the distinction
between a theory of short run fluctuations and a theory of movements in the
natural rate. It is my contention that this distinction is artificial and
anachronistic.
contract that has this property is said to be incentive compatible
and the principle is usually referred to as the revelation principle. See
the paper by Roger Myerson, "Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining
Problem", Econometrica vol. 47, 1979 pp. 61-74.
7Onemightargue that a theory that relies on an assumption that
workers are paid in cash does not fit well with recent experience. However,
the critical feature of the AlL explanation is that the opportunity cost of
liquidity is an increasing function of the nominal rate of interest. In
U.S. time series data the gap between the loan rate of interest and the
deposit rate is a stable linear function of the level of the three month T-
bill rate. It follows that even if firms hold their liquid assets in the24
form of interest bearing deposits they will still face a cost of liquidity
that increases systematically with the rate of interest. The papers by
Farmer (1988a,b) discuss this issue in more depth and provide evidence of
the relationship between loan rates and deposit rates for post-war U.S.
time-series data.
81 am grateful to Glenn Hubbard for drawingmy attention to this issue.
Atthepresent time an approach that integrates theory and data with the
same degree of precision as real business cycle theory is beyond our grasp.
Economies with informational perfections of the kind that I describe in this
paper can not be described as solutions to a planner's problem and one
cannot, therefore, exploit the second welfare theorem and reduce the
equilibrium of such an economy to a representative agent problem.
9J.D. Sargan and Alok Bhargava (1983). The Sargan-hargava test is
uniformly most powerful against the alternative of a first order stationary
Markov process and seems to be preferable to the alternative Dickey-Fuller
(1981) test which is not invariant to whether the alternative hypothesis is
a pure random walk or a random walk with drift.
regressions were run using David Hendry's program C.I.V.E.
11The residuals of the regression do not show evidence of auto-
correlation although I did find evidence of heteroscedasticity and they do
not pass tests for normality. There is no evidence of A.R.C.H. effects.
There is some evidence of mis-specification of the functional form although
I did not managetofind a parsimonious representation of the relationship
that performed better than the equation that is reported. A functional fort
in whichthelogarithmic difference of the unemployment rate appears on the
left hand side does significantly worse.
12Since there is some reason to believe that the methods of data
collection differ between pre-war and post-war samples (see the article by25
Christina Romer (1986)), it is possible thatthehypothesis that only the
real rate of interest is important would not be rejected if one had access
to a consistently collected sample in which there was substantial variation
in both variables.
13There is no evidence of a structural break in the data at any point
beyond 1947. The pre-1946 and post-war samples do show some evidence of
structural instability but this result is highly sensitive to the single
observation for 1946 which corresponds to the removal of war-time price
controls. If 1946 is included in the post-war sample, it dramatically
reduces (in absolute value) the magnitude of the post-war inflation co-
efficient. If 1946 is excluded from the post-war data, the effect of
inflation in the post-war sample is much closer to the pre-1946 value
'houghit is still estimated very imprecisely.
Litterman and Weiss (1985).
'5There are also open economy issues that I have not touched on.For
example, it may well be that, in addition to real rates of return, policy
may affect unemployment through effects on relative prices of domestic
versus foreign goods. By changing fiscal policy, the government may induce
a transition to a new equilibrium relative price. During the transition,
the effective real rate of interest will fluctuate. This offers a possible
channel by which fiscal policy may alter output in the short run even if the
long runrateof return is pegged by the world rate.26
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FigureI.
Title: Figure I: The Interest Rate and the Inflation
Rate.
Source: Pre—war data on interest rates is from Banking
and MonetarY Statistics of the United States;
prewar data on the GNP deflator is from the
National Income and Product Accounts, postwar
data on both variables is taken from the
Economic Report of the President.
Figure II.
Title: Figure II: The Unemployment Rate and the
Logarithm of Real Profits.
Source: Profits is taken from the National Income and
Product Accounts; Real Profits is national
income net of compensation to employees all
deflated by the G.N.P. deflator. Unemployment
data is from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Figure III.
Title: Figure III: The Interest Rate and the Inflation
Rate in First Differences.
Figure IV.
Title: Figure IV: The Unemployment Rate and Real
Profits in First Differences.
Figure V.
Title: Figure V: The Co-efficient on Inflation with
Two-Standard-Error Bounds Using a Recursive 2SLS
Estimator.Figure VI.
Title: Figure VI: The Co-efficient on the Interest Rate
with Two—Standard—Error Bounds Using a Recursive
2SLS EStimator.
Figure VII.
Title: Figure VII: The Co—efficient on Real Profits
with Two—Standard—Error Bounds Using a Recursive
2SLS Estimator.
Figure VIII.
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